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In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,' the Supreme Court fundamentally altered
the qualified immunity defense available to a government official charged
with a constitutional violation in a civil rights action for damages. Under
Harlow, an official is entitled to immunity unless his conduct violates a
"clearly established" constitutional right.' This purely objective standard
of qualified immunity is a radical departure from prior law, which per-
mitted a plaintiff to rebut an official's immunity defense by introducing
facts to show that the official had acted with malicious intent to cause a
constitutional deprivation or other injury.3 The Harlow Court believed
that such a drastic revision was necessary to shield officials from the bur-
den of defending against insubstantial lawsuits based solely on conclusory
allegations of malice.4 By focusing exclusively on the "clearly established"
requirement and foreclosing factual inquiry into an official's state of
mind, Harlow transformed the issue of qualified immunity from a mixed
question of fact and law into a pure question of law to be resolved by the
court on a motion for summary judgment.5
1. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
2. Id. at 818.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 21-29.
4. 457 U.S. at 816-18.
5. A number of case notes have commented upon Harlow and its reformulation of the qualified
immunity test. See Comment, Harlow v. Fitzgerald: The Lower Courts Implement the New Standard
for Qualified Immunity Under Section 1983, 132 U. PA. L. REa. 901 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, The Lower Courts Implement] (analyzing how court should determine whether controlling
law was clearly established); Comment, Rejecting Absolute Immunity for Federal Officials, 71 CALIF.
L. REV. 1707 (1983) (advocating expanded regime of governmental liability coupled with amendment
to Federal Torts Claims Act codifying Harlow test); Note; An Examination of Immunity for Federal
Executive Officials, 28 VILL. L. REV. 956 (1983) (advocating extension of Harlow qualified immu-
nity standard to all government officials, including legislative aides, to promote uniformity in treat-
ment); The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REv. 62, 226-36 (1982) (arguing that Harlow
will leave many plaintiffs without redress in ambiguous or uncharted areas of law); Comment, Entity
and Official Immunities Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983: The Supreme Court Adopts a Solely Objec-
tive Test, 28 S.D.L. REv. 337 (1983) (noting that Harlow fundamentally altered nature of qualified
immunity defense); Comment, Immunity: Eliminating the Subjective Element from the Qualified Im-
munity Standard in Actions Brought Against Government Officials, 22 WASHBURN L.J. 577 (1983)
Qualified Immunity
In reformulating the qualified immunity defense, however, the Supreme
Court failed to distinguish between "malice" as an element necessary to
rebut an official's qualified immunity defense and "state of mind" as an
element of the plaintiff's substantive claim. It is unlikely that the Court
meant for Harlow to prevent a plaintiff from inquiring into the reasons
behind an official's conduct when the substantive law controlling the
plaintiff's claim makes the official's state of mind a necessary component
of the constitutional violation. Applied literally, however, Harlow's wholly
objective immunity standard threatens to eviscerate the civil rights remedy
in just such cases. Moreover, because these suits often involve the inten-
tional abuse of government power, the Harlow standard would deny re-
dress to victims of precisely the kind of official misconduct that the civil
rights remedy was primarily intended to address.
This Note argues that the qualified immunity inquiry must be restruc-
tured to force the lower courts to resolve the purely legal question of an
official's qualified immunity independently of any factual inquiry into an
official's state of mind. Although inquiry into an official's state of mind is
inappropriate for purposes of the qualified immunity determination,
Harlow should not be construed to prohibit such inquiry whenever it is
essential to establishing a valid substantive claim. The restructuring pro-
posed by this Note is imperative if the Harlow standard is to strike a
satisfactory balance between the conflicting interests of plaintiffs and gov-
ernment officials in civil rights actions.
I. THE LAW OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
The ability of a plaintiff in a civil rights suit6 to recover damages from
a government official is severely restricted by the law of qualified immu-
(same).
6. Civil rights actions against state officials in their individual capacities are permitted under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Section 1983 creates no substantive rights; it only provides a right of action to vindicate those rights
already guaranteed by the Constitution or federal statute. See, e.g., Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,
144 n.3 (1979) (Section 1983 is "not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating
federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and federal statutes
that it describes.").
Section 1983 was originally enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13,
13. Although originally designed to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment and to pro-
tect the constitutional rights of black citizens in the South during Reconstruction, the remedial func-
tion of § 1983 has been interpreted broadly by the federal courts to extend beyond the context of
racial discrimination to violations of any substantive right secured by the Constitution or federal law.
See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172-87 (1961) (recognizing right of action under § 1983 for
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nity,1 which protects officials from liability for constitutional violations in
all but the most egregious cases.' The law of qualified immunity is an
imperfect attempt by the federal courts to accommodate three competing
goals: (1) providing effective redress to persons whose constitutional rights
have been violated by government officials, (2) deterring officials from
abusing their power in derogation of the Constitution, and (3) protecting
officials from being unduly burdened by the threat of potential liability in
the discharge of their discretionary duties.9
Fourth Amendment violation even though challenged conduct violated state law because official was
vested with authority of state law); see also P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 47-51 (1983) (discuss-
ing historical evolution of § 1983).
Suits against federal officials for constitutional violations have been permitted only since 1971 by
virtue of the Supreme Court's decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)- (recognizing implied cause of action for damages against federal
official in individual capacity for constitutional violation). The Supreme Court has limited this cause
of action, however, to situations in which "Congress has [not] provided an alternative remedy which it
explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as
equally effective." Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980) (emphasis in original).
For a concise discussion of official liability and immunity doctrines in the federal courts, see P.
SCHUCK, supra, at 203-05.
7. Some government officials have been permitted to claim absolute immunity from damages ac-
tions for constitutional violations. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (legislators, for acts
in their legislative capacity); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecutors, for their
prosecutorial acts); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (judges, for their judicial acts); Nixon v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (President of United States). These officials remain subject to the
criminal law for willful deprivations of constitutional rights. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1982) (criminal analog
of § 1983). See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 429; O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974).
Executive officials have generally been limited to a qualified immunity defense unless they perform
special prosecutorial or adjudicative functions which require a broad exemption from liability. See
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508-17 (1978).
8. Although § 1983 and the Bivens doctrine authorize civil rights actions for injunctive and de-
claratory relief, this Note is concerned solely with actions seeking compensatory damages. Because
injunctive and declaratory actions do not carry the threat of personal liability, the Supreme Court has
ruled that the law of qualified immunity does not bar injunctive and declaratory suits against govern-
ment officials. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 n.34; see also Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct. 1970 (1984)
(judicial immunity no bar to prospective injunctive relief against judicial officer acting in judicial
capacity).
Furthermore, while § 1983 has been interpreted to encompass claims based on violations of federal
statutes, see Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980), this Note will address only constitutionally-
based claims.
9. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239-42, 245-48 (1974) (emphasizing injustice of subject-
ing to liability officials who are required to exercise discretion, and societal interest in encouraging
vigorous exercise of official authority); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504-07 (1978) (public policy
considerations support limited immunity for federal executive officials despite importance of providing
redress to injured citizens and deterring officials from committing constitutional wrongs); and Harlow,
457 U.S. at 813-15 (resolution of immunity question requires balance between vindication of constitu-
tional guarantees and social costs of suits against public officials). See also Comment, The Lower
Courts Implement, supra note 5, at 913-15 (discussing interaction between three goals of compensa-
tion, deterrence, and protection of public officials in development of qualified immunity defense in
civil rights litigation).
No clear consensus exists as to the relative weight that should be given to each of these goals.
Compare P. SCHUCK, supra note 6, at 59-121 (arguing that official liability for damages creates
perverse incentives for official behavior and advocating expanded regime of governmental liability)
and Cass, Damage Suits Against Public Officers, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1110 (1981) (qualified immu-
nity seriously inhibits officials' discretionary conduct while only rarely permitting damage awards to
Qualified Immunity
In analyzing the scope of the immunity defense accorded government
officials charged with constitutional violations, it is important to note that
the law of qualified immunity is entirely a creation of the courts, without
textual basis in either the Constitution or statute.10 In an effort to mitigate
the social costs that attend the litigation of suits against officials,""
the federal courts have consistently drawn on common law doctrines of
official immunity1 2 to fashion a defense for officials in the constitutional
plaintiffs) with Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 COR-
NELL L. REV. 482 (1982) (Supreme Court should not have interposed common law immunity doc-
trines into § 1983 litigation to bar recovery by plaintiffs whose constitutional rights have been vio-
lated) and Freed, Executive Official Immunity for Constitutional Violations: An Analysis and a
Critique, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 526 (1977) (qualified immunity standard emphasizing "settled" law
rather than reasonableness effectively eliminates official liability and leaves injured plaintiffs without
a remedy).
10. In creating the Bivens remedy, the Supreme Court specifically reserved for future resolution
the question of whether federal government officials are entitled to some form of immunity by virtue
of their position and the nature of their duties. 403 U.S. at 397-98. However, other than the speech
and debate clause in article 1, section 6, which provides that members of Congress may not be chal-
lenged with respect to their official legislative activities, there is nothing in the U.S. Constitution
which expressly mandates such immunity.
Similarly, the plain text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates no exceptions for special classes of persons,
and a literal reading of the statute suggests that a government official, like any other person, is subject
to § 1983 liability for a constitutional infringement. See Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 492-93.
11. The Supreme Court has cited three specific costs which attend the litigation of suits against
government officials. First, litigation diverts official energy and resources from pressing public
problems. Second, the threat of personal liability may discourage able persons from entering public
office. Third, the fear of being sued may seriously deter an official from executing his office with the
decisiveness and judgment required for the public good. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814; Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. at 240.
Professor Schuck has elaborated on these costs and concluded that fear of litigation leads officials to
engage in self-protection and risk-minimizing behavior to the detriment of the greater public interest.
See P. SCHUCK, supra note 6, at 59-81. However, no empirical evidence has ever been amassed to
support that view. Furthermore, the threat of litigation and personal liability is mitigated by the fact
that the government will generally provide counsel or pay for private counsel to represent a defendant
employee. Moreover, most state and local governmental units will either indemnify or insure the
employee for any judgment entered against him arising out of the good-faith performance of his offi-
cial duties. Id. at 83-88.
For the view that the threat of personal liability for state and local officials under § 1983 has not
been so great as to interfere with the performance of government by inhibiting the conduct of officials,
see Jaron, The Threat of Personal Liability Under the Federal Civil Rights Act: Does It Interfere
with the Performance of State and Local Government?, 13 URB. LAW. 1 (1981). Jaron suggests that
one positive benefit of § 1983 liability has been the increasing frequency with which state and local
governments are adopting ongoing risk management programs "to identify potential exposures to loss
and to reduce or control the possibility that the loss will occur through a number of identified ap-
proaches and techniques, such as training programs designed to improve the performance of public
officials." Id. at 21 (footnote omitted). By increasing awareness of potential risks and by engendering
respect for the basic constitutional rights protected by § 1983, Jaron argues, effective risk management
can minimize hazards while also reducing the costs of government.
12. Government officials enjoyed absolute immunity from personal liability at common law as an
extension of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. at 238-42
(discussing rationales behind common law immunity); see also P. SCHUCK, supra note 6, at 30-41
(discussing in detail English and American common law positions).
Federal officials continue to enjoy absolute immunity for violations of the common law. See Barr v.
Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
949 (1950). Harlow did not alter the application of this doctrine in common law tort actions. See, e.g.,
Oyler v. National Guard Ass'n of United States, 743 F.2d 545, 551-53 (7th Cir. 1984); McKinney v.
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realm.1" To appreciate the magnitude of the change worked by Harlow on
the law of qualified immunity, and its ominous implications for civil
rights litigation in general,1 ' it is first necessary to examine the develop-
ment and refinement of the qualified immunity doctrine in the federal
courts.
A. The Origin of the Qualified Immunity Doctrine in Civil Rights
Litigation
In 1967 in Pierson v. Ray,1 5 the Supreme Court considered for the first
time whether a government official sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should
be permitted to raise a qualified immunity defense.
1 6 Concluding that
Congress did not intend section 1983 to abrogate the common law immu-
nities traditionally accorded government officials, the Court permitted a
police officer to raise the specific common law defense of good faith and
probable cause in a section 1983 action alleging unconstitutional 
arrest. 7
Several years later in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 8 the Supreme Court extended
its holding in Pierson by recognizing a reasonable good-faith immunity
defense to section 1983 liability for high-ranking state executives. While
declining to define the full scope of the immunity available to executive
officials, the Court did suggest that the defense was based on "the exis-
tence of reasonable grounds for the belief [that the official's actions were
not constitutionally proscribed,] formed at the time and in light of all the
circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief."
19 The Court's language in-
Whitfield, 736 F.2d 766, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
13. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 29 (1980) ("The immunities of state officials that we have
recognized for purposes of § 1983 are the equivalents of those that were recognized at common law
. ... ). For a view critical of the federal courts' activity, see Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 494-96
(immunity doctrines formulated in common law tradition are inapplicable within context of federal
system to civil rights actions alleging violations of federal Constitution).
14. Because the doctrine of sovereign immunity prohibits an action against the governmental en-
tity itself in most cases, see P. ScHucK, supra note 6, at 203-05, the ability of an injured plaintiff to
bring a damages action against the government official in his individual capacity is essential. See
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("For people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or
nothing."); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 ("In situations of abuse of office, an action for damages may
offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees.").
15. 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (policemen charged with unconstitutional arrest of white and black cler-
gymen attempting to use segregated facilities in interstate bus terminal).
16. Although the Supreme Court's early decisions regarding the law of qualified immunity in-
volved state officials, Butz v. Economou confirmed the general belief that a Bivens action against a
federal official should be governed by the same standard of qualified immunity as a § 1983 suit
against a state official. 438 U.S. 478, 486 & n.9 (1978). The Court deemed it untenable "[tio create a
system in which the Bill of Rights monitors more closely the conduct of state officials than it does that
of federal officials." Id. at 504.
17. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 557.
18. 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (Governor of Ohio sued under § 1983 in connection with his decision to
deploy Ohio National Guard on Kent State campus during May 1970 demonstrations against Viet-
nam War).
19. Id. at 247-48.
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dicated that both objective and subjective factors would be relevant to the
immunity inquiry.
The qualified immunity defense articulated in Scheuer, however,
proved too vague to guide the lower federal courts in deciding whether an
official was actually entitled to immunity in a given case.2" The Supreme
Court therefore attempted in Wood v. Strickland21 to provide a precise
standard against which an official's conduct could be more readily mea-
sured. The reformulated defense contained both an objective and a subjec-
tive component. An official would be stripped of his immunity if either:
(1) he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took
within the sphere of his official responsibility would violate the plaintiff's
clearly established constitutional rights, or (2) he acted with malicious in-
tent to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury.
22
The objective prong of the Wood standard imputed to officials knowl-
edge of "basic, unquestioned constitutional rights."'23 Conduct violative of
these rights was deemed per se unreasonable and thus did not warrant the
protection of the law of qualified immunity.
The subjective prong of the Wood standard focused on an official's sub-
jective state of mind. It became operative only when the relevant constitu-
tional right was not clearly established, but was instead located on the
developing fringe of constitutional law. Because officials cannot be ex-
pected to anticipate future developments in constitutional law,24 the rea-
sonableness of conduct violating such a "fringe" right turned on a subjec-
tive factor-whether the official had acted with malicious intent.25
The lower courts had little difficulty applying the objective prong of the
20. See Friedman, The Good Faith Defense in Constitutional Litigation, 5 HoFssRA L. REv.
501, 511-12 (1977) (discussing questions left unanswered by Scheuer. "Did 'good faith' mean that the
government officials acted without malice or an evil intent, that they affirmatively believed that they
were acting within the law or the limits of their authority, or that they were following what they
thought were lawful orders of their superiors?").
21. 420 U.S. 308 (1975). The respondents in Wood were high school students who had been
expelled by the local school board for violating a school regulation. The school board members con-
tended that they were entitled to immunity from respondents' § 1983 action which alleged due process
violations. Id. at 309-11.
22. Id. at 322. Although the Wood holding was limited explicitly to school board members sued
under § 1983, id., the Supreme Court quoted the Wood formulation in subsequent cases as the gen-
eral standard of qualified immunity. See, e.g., Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 139 (1979);
Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 562-63, 565-66 (1978).
23. Wood, 420 U.S. at 322.
24. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967) (government official cannot be "charged with
predicting the future course of constitutional law").
25. A showing of malicious intent, however, did not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of establish-
ing a valid constitutional claim in the first place. Where the substantive law underlying the plaintiff's
claim made the official's state of mind an essential element of the constitutional violation, the plaintiff
was still required to demonstrate that the official had acted with a purpose or intent deemed unconsti-
tutional regardless of whether the official had also acted with malice. See infra text accompanying
notes 44-50.
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Wood test. Whether an official's conduct had violated a constitutional
right was a question of law, which could be resolved by the court on a
motion for summary judgment.26 The subjective prong, however, proved
far more problematic. Whether an official had acted with the requisite
malicious intent was a question of fact, which normally could be resolved
only after a full trial.27 Yet, requiring an official to go through a full-scale
trial before judging the validity of his immunity defense defeated one of
the principal purposes of the qualified immunity doctrine-to shield offi-
cials from the costs attending litigation. More importantly, because even
conclusory allegations of malicious intent would force an official into court
to defend against an otherwise frivolous lawsuit,28 the subjective prong of
the test was open to abuse by plaintiffs seeking to harass government
officials.
29
B. The Harlow Standard of Qualified Immunity
Responding to the problems created by the subjective component of the
Wood standard, the Supreme Court set out in Harlow v. Fitzgerald0 to
increase the protection afforded government officials by the qualified im-
munity defense. 1 After explaining why the Wood standard tended to per-
26. The objective prong of the Wood test has been criticized, however, on the ground that by
limiting an official's liability to violations of clearly established rights, officials are in effect allowed
one free violation of any constitutional right not previously recognized by the courts, and are rewarded
for devising new and ingenious ways of infringing upon constitutional guarantees. See, e.g., Freed,
supra note 9, at 558-62.
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 56 provides that a motion for summary judgment may be granted only if
"there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and. . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law." As a result, the federal courts have generally held that summary judgment is
inappropriate to resolve claims in which factual issues of intent, good faith, and other subjective atti-
tudes play a dominant role. See, e.g., Landrum v. Moats, 576 F.2d 1320, 1329 (8th Cir. 1978);
Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 832-33 (2d Cir. 1977); cf. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S.
111, 120 n.9 (1979) (suggesting that question of "actual malice" in libel suit against public figure
cannot properly be resolved on summary judgment because it presents issue of fact).
28. judge Gerhard Gesell observed:
It is not difficult for ingenious plaintiff's counsel to create a material issue of fact on some
element of the immunity defense where subtle questions of constitutional law and a deci-
sionmaker's mental processes are involved. A sentence from a casual document or a difference
in recollection with regard to a particular policy conversation held long ago would usually,
under the normal summary judgment standards, be sufficient [to force a full trial on the
merits].
Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Gesell, J., concurring), affd in part by
an equally divided Court, cert. dismissed in part, 452 U.S 713 (1981).
29. In Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), the Supreme Court recognized that a serious
consequence of subjecting executive officials to private lawsuits was the danger that they would be
harassed by frivolous litigation. To minimize this threat, Butz admonished the lower courts to dispose
of insubstantial suits whenever possible by granting summary judgment for the official based on the
qualified immunity defense. Id. at 507-08. The subjective component of the Wood standard, however,
often prevented the trial courts from complying with this instruction.
30. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
31. Harlow involved a Bivens action brought by A. Ernest Fitzgerald, an Air Force management
analyst, alleging that Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield, senior White House aides to President
Qualified Immunity
mit insubstantial lawsuits to proceed to trial, the Court concluded that in
cases alleging the violation of a "fringe" right, the costs of litigating
whether an official had acted with malicious intent were unacceptably
high. 2 Accordingly, the Harlow Court ruled that a plaintiff could no
longer allege malicious intent to defeat an official's qualified immunity
defense in a civil rights action.33 It then set forth a reformulated stan-
dard34 whereby a government official performing discretionary functions
is entitled to immunity from civil damages "insofar as [his] conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known."3 5 The Harlow Court provided lit-
Nixon, had conspired with the President to have Fitzgerald dismissed in retaliation for his congres-
sional testimony concerning cost overruns in defense contracts and the Defense Department's ques-
tionable purchasing practices. 457 U.S. at 802-06. Fitzgerald's claim was based primarily on First
Amendment violations.
In addition to raising the qualified immunity defense, Harlow and Butterfield argued that as Presi-
dential aides they were entitled to absolute immunity derived from the absolute immunity of the
President himself. By their analysis, derivative absolute immunity was essential given that "the Presi-
dent must delegate a large measure of authority to execute the duties of his office." Id. at 810. The
Court rejected this argument and held that Presidential aides were limited to a qualified immunity
defense. Id. at 809.
Nixon was the named defendant in a companion case, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982). In
Nixon, the Supreme Court held that the President was entitled to absolute immunity from civil
liability.
32. The Harlow Court noted that, given the difficulty of defining the relevant evidence, judicial
inquiry into an official's subjective motivation often entailed broad-ranging discovery, including nu-
merous depositions of the official and his professional colleagues, and full-scale trials, all of which
were extremely disruptive of effective government. 457 U.S. at 817. To minimize the social costs
associated with permitting suits against government officials, the Court believed that it was necessary
to limit official liability to those cases in which the reasonableness of the official's conduct could be
measured objectively. Id. at 817-18.
33. 457 U.S. at 817-18. Seven Justices joined Justice Powell's majority opinion in Harlow. Chief
Justice Burger dissented on the ground that the defendants were entitled to absolute immunity derived
from the President's immunity. Id. at 822-29. There were three concurrences. The first concurrence,
written by Justice Brennan, and joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, set forth a different
interpretation of the reformulated qualified immunity test, which is discussed infra note 35. Id. at
820-21. A second concurrence, written again by Justice Brennan, and joined by Justices White, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun, stressed that by joining the majority opinion in Harlow, they did not mean to
imply any approval of the holding in Nixon v. Fitzgerald that the President was absolutely immune
from civil damages for constitutional violations. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 821-22. In a third concurrence,
Justice Rehnquist joined the majority opinion, but noted that the holding in Butz v. Economou, that
federal executive officials are entitled to qualified, rather than absolute, immunity, should be re-
examined. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 822.
34. Although Harlow involved a Bivens suit against federal officials, the Court indicated that its
decision in Butz v. Economou, discussed supra note 16, dictated that the standard of qualified immu-
nity announced in Harlow apply with equal force to § 1983 actions against state officials. Harlow,
457 U.S. at 818 n.30.
35. Id. at 818. The Harlow Court, however, did create an exception that would preclude a trial
court from granting summary judgment "if the official pleading the defense claims extraordinary
circumstances and can prove that he neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal stan-
dard." 457 US. at 819. The Court emphasized, however, that even if an official advanced such ex-
traordinary circumstances, the immunity defense would still turn "primarily on objective factors." Id.
In a concurring opinion, 457 U.S. at 820-21, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and
Blackmun, seized on the extraordinary circumstances exception to reformulate the qualified immunity
standard articulated by the majority in such a way as to retain a role for subjective inquiry. The
concurrence suggested that liability should be imposed whenever an official knew or should have
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tie instruction as to how a district court should actually conduct the modi-
fied immunity inquiry, 8 but it did specify that the issue of qualified im-
munity should be treated as a threshold question to be resolved by the
trial court as a matter of law on summary judgment before any discovery
is allowed.
3 7
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the objective nature of the Harlow
standard in its recent decision in Davis v. Scherer."' The Court explained
that Harlow had rejected any inquiry into an official's subjective state of
mind in favor of a wholly objective standard. Consequently, in determin-
ing whether an official may prevail on his qualified immunity defense, a
trial court may look only to whether the official's conduct violated clearly
established law. The Davis Court emphasized that under Harlow "no
other 'circumstances' are relevant to the issue of qualified immunity.""9
II. THE Harlow STANDARD AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE
PLAINTIFF'S SUBSTANTIVE CLAIM
In adopting a purely objective standard of qualified immunity, the Su-
preme Court in Harlow failed to consider the overlap between the law of
qualified immunity as formulated in Wood v. Strickland and the constitu-
tional law underlying a plaintiff's substantive claim. By eliminating mali-
cious intent from the law of qualified immunity, the Harlow Court surely
known of the constitutionally violative effect of his actions. Id. Under the concurrence's formulation of
the standard, an official who actually knew that he was violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights
would be held liable for his actions even though the rights were not dearly established and he could
not reasonably have been expected to know that he was violating the Constitution. Accordingly, the
concurrence would allow some measure of discovery to determine exactly what an official did know at
the time he acted. Id. at 821.
The validity of the concurrence's interpretation of the qualified immunity defense advanced in
Harlow is highly questionable. The process of determining whether an official knew that he was
violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights would presumably suffer from the same defects as the
process of determining whether an official acted with malicious intent-precisely what the Court was
attempting to remedy in Harlow.
36. The Harlow Court refused to rule on the defendant officials' motion for summary judgment
on appeal and instead remanded the case for further factual findings concerning whether the plaintiff
had been dismissed for a constitutionally proscribed reason. 457 U.S. at 819-20. As a consequence,
the Court did not have the opportunity to apply its standard to an actual case, and the lower courts
were left without explicit instruction as to how that standard should operate in practice, particularly
in cases such as Harlow where the controlling constitutional law itself contains a subjective compo-
nent. See infra note 40. Harlow was eventually settled without further court proceedings.
37. 457 U.S. at 818-19.
38. 104 S. Ct. 3012 (1984) (state officials entitled to qualified immunity because Fourteenth
Amendment due process violation not clearly established even though officials violated state statute
and administrative regulations).
39. Id. at 3018. The Supreme Court had a further opportunity to consider the nature of the
qualified immunity inquiry post-Harlow in Mitchell v. Forsyth, 105 S. Ct. 2806 (1985), in which the
Court held that a pretrial order denying qualified immunity is immediately appealable under the
"collateral order" doctrine. Again the Court emphasized that the immunity question is a purely legal
one: "Whether the facts alleged . . . support a claim of violation of clearly established law." Id. at
2816 n.9.
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did not mean to insulate officials from liability in all cases in which the
controlling substantive law makes the official's state of mind an essential
component of the alleged constitutional violation.4 Unfortunately, it ar-
ticulated an immunity standard which, if applied literally, would do just
that.
Had the Harlow Court actually intended to restrict a plaintiff's ability
to recover to those actions in which the controlling substantive law con-
tains no subjective elements, it would have granted the defendant officials'
motion for summary judgment on appeal instead of remanding the case
for further factual findings concerning the purpose behind plaintiff Fitz-
gerald's termination." Fitzgerald had alleged that he was dismissed in
retaliation for his exercise of his First Amendment rights.4 Under the
controlling legal doctrine, Fitzgerald was .required to establish that his
constitutionally protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in
his dismissal. 43 If the Court had in fact wanted to eliminate this sort of
purpose inquiry, it could easily have done so in Harlow.
A. Subjective Elements in Substantive Constitutional Law
The drastic implications of the Harlow standard for civil rights litiga-
tion are evidenced by the wide range of constitutional claims for which the
controlling substantive law contains some type of subjective element.44
Subjective issues in substantive constitutional doctrine have arisen in two
contexts. Certain constitutional guarantees have been interpreted to re-
quire a showing of specific intent to establish a violation. For example, a
purposeful discriminatory intent is required to establish an equal protec-
40. The elimination of the subjective component from the qualified immunity standard had been
neither briefed nor carefully considered at oral argument. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 21-22,
Nixon (No. 79-1738) and Harlow (No. 80-945). To minimize the burden on government officials of
defending against insubstantial lawsuits grounded in conelusory allegations of malicious intent, the
petitioners Harlow and Butterfield had merely suggested that the Court adopt a legal standard of
sufficiency of evidence that inquired into "whether the credible evidence. . . adds up to a substantial
showing that the defendants were implicated." Brief for Petitioners Harlow & Butterfield at 18-19,
Harlow (No. 80-945) (petition for certiorari). It is thus doubtful that the Supreme Court gave much
consideration to how its reformulated standard of immunity would actually be applied by the lower
courts.
41. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819-20.
42. Id. at 802-06.
43. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
44. Section 1983 itself contains no state-of-mind requirement. See supra note 6. It simply autho-
rizes a cause of action against an official based on a constitutional violation. Many constitutional
guarantees, however, have been interpreted to contain state-of-mind requirements that must be satis-
fied for a violation to have occurred. See Kirkpatrick, Defining a Constitutional Tort Under Section
1983: The State-of-Mind Requirement, 46 U. CIN. L. REv. 45 (1977).
As necessary elements of the plaintiff's constitutional claim, these state-of-mind requirements are
distinct from the malicious intent component of the Wood standard in that they refer to an official's
acting for a purpose or with a specific intent deemed unconstitutional regardless of whether or not the
official acted with malice. See supra note 25.
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tion violation.45 Similarly, a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibi-
tion against cruel and unusual punishment requires a showing of "delib-
erate indifference."'48  Hence, a prison official who negligently fails to
protect an inmate from attack by another inmate has not violated the
Eighth Amendment, but a prison official who knows of such an attack
and does nothing to prevent the inmate from being injured will have com-
mitted a constitutional violation.'
The violation of other constitutional rights, primarily those guaranteed
by the First and Fourth Amendments, often depends upon the purpose
underlying the allegedly wrongful conduct. Conduct which appears legally
valid on its face will constitute a violation if undertaken for a constitution-
ally impermissible purpose.48 For instance, it is perfectly legal for a gov-
ernment official to fire a subordinate if he fails to come to work regularly,
but the First Amendment prohibits him from firing the subordinate be-
cause of his political affiliation.49 Similarly, a prison official may conduct
a warrantless search of an inmate's cell when prison security is
threatened, but the Fourth Amendment prohibits him from conducting
such a search to further a prosecutorial investigation.
50
45. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (purposeful discriminatory intent neces-
sary to establish equal protection violation for racial discrimination in employment); Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980) (same for racial discrimination in voting); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979) (same for gender discrimination).
46. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976).
47. See, e.g., Branchcomb v. Brewer, 669 F.2d 1297, 1298 (8th Cir. 1982); Gullatte v. Potts, 654
F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir. 1981).
48. Federal District Court Judge Warriner has described a number of situations in which a de-
fendant's purpose or intent is crucial to determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred:
[A] police officer does not violate a citizen's constitutional rights for accidently running into
him on the street. . . unless that police officer was trying to prevent the citizen from arriving
at the polls to vote. If the officer was trying to hinder the person in voting, his mere verbal
intimidation of the citizen might well state a constitutional claim. If the officer accidently ran
into a march of peaceful protesters, mangling and killing several, his careless driving alone
would amount to no more than a State tort . . . . If, however, he swerved to frighten the
protestors, of whom he disapproved, his accidental bruising of even one makes out a First
Amendment violation under § 1983, being the natural result of an unconstitutional intent.
Defamation of a citizen under color of State law likewise would not state a constitutional claim
unless that defamation was, say, intended as coercion of the citizen's exercise of a specific
constitutional right.
Danbridge v. Police Dept. of Richmond, 566 F. Supp. 152, 160-61 (E.D. Va. 1983) (citations
omitted).
49. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 513-17 (1980); see also Mt. Healthy City School Dist.
Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. at 287 (requiring evidence that protected conduct was substantial
factor in alleged retaliatory dismissal to establish violation of First Amendment).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Vallez, 653 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 904
(1981); United States v. Savage, 482 F.2d 1371, 1373 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 932
(1974).
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B. Harlow and the Problem of Unconstitutional Purpose
The Harlow standard of qualified immunity has generated much confu-
sion in the lower federal courts with respect to how an objective standard
should operate in cases in which the substantive law controlling the plain-
tiff's claim makes state of mind an essential element of the constitutional
violation. The confusion is largely the result of the fact that these cases
usually involve disputed factual questions concerning the official's purpose
or intent in acting.51 The resulting misconstruction of the law of qualified
immunity has taken two forms. The first occurs when the factual validity
of the plaintiffs substantive claim is determined by the court on a motion
for summary judgment. The second occurs when the legal validity of the
official's qualified immunity defense is determined by the trier of fact at
trial.
1. Questions of Fact Resolved by the Court
If Harlow is construed to prohibit factual inquiry into state of mind in
cases in which the purpose or intent underlying an official's conduct is
dispositive of its legality, then an official can shield himself from the legal
consequences of his unconstitutional conduct by disingenuously declaring
that his purpose or intent was perfectly legitimate, that his conduct there-
fore did not violate clearly established law, and that he is accordingly enti-
tled to qualified immunity.5" For instance, the government official charged
with violating the First Amendment by firing a public employee who re-
vealed inefficient departmental practices to the press can assert that the
employee was actually terminated because his work was of poor quality.53
51. The lower courts have also had some difficulty in determining how they should measure
whether a given constitutional right was clearly established. The Supreme Court in Harlow failed to
indicate whether the opinions of the Supreme Court, the Courts of Appeals, the District Courts, the
state courts, or all of the foregoing should serve as the reference point. The Court also failed to specify
how closely the facts of a precedential case must correspond to an official's challenged conduct before
it can be said that the official violated clearly established law. Naturally, the greater the degree of
correspondence required, the easier it will be for an official to claim successfully that he is entitled to
immunity. See Nahmod, Constitutional Wrongs Without Remedies: Executive Offiial Immunity, 62
WASH. U.L.Q. 221, 250-58 (1984); Comment, The Lower Courts Implement, supra note 5, at
918-20.
52. This type of error has occurred primarily in cases involving alleged violations of the First or
Fourth Amendment. For cases involving First Amendment violations, see infra note 53. For cases
involving Fourth Amendment violations, see infra note 56.
53. See, e.g., Egger v. Phillips, 710 F.2d 292, 314-15 (7th Cir.) (en banc) (suggesting that
Harlow prevents court from inquiring into reasons behind a transfer allegedly ordered in retaliation
for plaintiff's exercise of First Amendment freedoms), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 284 (1983); Tubbesing
v. Arnold, 742 F.2d 401 (8th Cir. 1984) (official granted summary judgment on immunity defense
despite plaintiff's allegation that she was dismissed for political reasons in violation of First Amend-
ment); Gilles v. Alley, 591 F. Supp. 181 (M.D. Ala. 1984) (official granted summary judgment on
immunity defense despite plaintiff's allegation that he was transferred in retaliation for exercise of
First Amendment freedoms).
In Egger v. Phillips, plaintiff, a former FBI agent, claimed that his First Amendment rights had
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Similarly, the official charged with an equal protection violation can claim
that the purpose motivating the allegedly discriminatory conduct was be-
nign. Unable to challenge the factual validity of the official's pretextual
assertions regarding his state of mind, the victim whose rights have been
violated will find himself out of court without a remedy.
54 A literal appli-
cation of Harlow thus permits an official to be granted qualified immu-
nity as a matter of law even though the principal disputed question of fact
in the case-the true purpose or intent motivating the official's con-
duct-remains unresolved. More accurately, the principal disputed ques-
tion of fact, which forms the basis of the substantive claim, is subsumed by
the legal immunity inquiry and implicitly resolved by the court against
the plaintiff when it concludes, on the basis of nothing more than the
official's pretextual- assertions,-that the allegedly unconstitutional conduct
contravened no clearly established law.5
This type of error is well illustrated by the lower courts' treatment of a
series of Fourth Amendment challenges to warrantless electronic surveil-
lances authorized by federal officials in the Nixon Administration.
5" The
been violated when he was transferred to a remote duty station after reporting that a fellow agent was
engaged in illegal activities. The defendant official asserted that the transfer was motivated by strained
personal relations between plaintiff and other agents in the office. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the
entry of summary judgment for the official in part on the qualified immunity defense, on the ground
that although the plaintiff might have had a dearly established right not to be discharged on the basis
of speech, the same protection did not extend to a transfer necessary to relieve severe disharmony in
the office. Concluding that under Harlow the official's "subjective motivation is not relevant to the
qualified immunity question," the court refused to inquire into the reasons behind the transfer to
determine whether they were in fact lawful. Id. at 314-15. Relying on defendant's asserted explana-
tion of the challenged transfer, the court held that strained personal relations between an employee
and his co-workers were a permissible basis for a transfer "notwithstanding the root cause of the
strained relations." Id. at 315 (emphasis added).
Following the analysis in Egger, the district court in Gilles v. Alley similarly refused to inquire into
the motives behind a plaintiff employee's transfer after he had reported that the state veterinary ser-
vice failed to follow federal guidelines. "Under Harlow, defendant's subjective intent is no longer
relevant." Id. at 188. Accepting as true defendant's proferred reason that the transfer was necessitated
by strained office relations and a desire to ease disruption, the court held that the official had violated
no clearly established law and was accordingly entitled to qualified immunity.
54. The plaintiff is rendered powerless by the fact that Harlow prohibits discovery until the
threshold immunity inquiry has been resolved. 457 U.S. at 818. Hence, he cannot begin to gather
evidence to counter the official's assertions until after the official has been granted immunity, at which
point it is simply too late.
55. In a Title VII case, a plaintiff attempting to prove employment discrimination at trial must be
given an opportunity to demonstrate that the apparently legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons offered
by the defendant for rejecting the plaintiff are pretextual and without factual basis. See Texas Dep't
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53, 256 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973). Because this pretext inquiry takes place during the course of
trial on the merits, the Title VII analogy is not entirely apposite to the plight of a civil rights plaintiff
who must survive a threshold determination of the qualified immunity issue. The analogy does, how-
ever, illustrate the error of dismissing an action on nothing more than the defendant's assertion that he
acted with a lawful purpose.
56. See, e.g., Zweibon v. Mitchell, 720 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 244
(1984); Burkhart v. Saxbe, 596 F. Supp. 96 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Smith v. Nixon, 582 F. Supp. 709
(D.D.C. 1984); Halperin v. Kissinger, 578 F. Supp. 231 (D.D.C. 1984); Ellsberg v. Mitchell, No.
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clearly established constitutional and statutory law governing the plain-
tiffs' claims required that all wiretaps conform to certain warrant and
reasonableness requirements unless conducted for national security rea-
sons.5" As a result, the principal issue of fact in these cases concerned the
purpose behind the challenged wiretaps.
The plaintiffs' substantive claims alleged that the warrantless surveil-
lances were motivated by partisan political strategy and hence were con-
stitutionally invalid. In response, the defendant officials asserted that be-
cause the wiretaps had been undertaken for national security purposes,
their conduct violated no clearly established law, thus entitling them to
summary judgment based on the qualified immunity defense. They fur-
ther contended that Harlow foreclosed factual inquiry into an official's
state of mind in resolving the immunity issue and consequently prevented
the plaintiffs from challenging the national security characterization of the
wiretaps. Mistakenly equating the charge of impermissible purpose, a
component of the substantive claims, with a charge of subjective malice, a
component of the immunity defense clearly inappropriate after Harlow,"8
the trial courts unquestioningly accepted the officials' explanation of the
purpose underlying the challenged taps and ruled that the Harlow stan-
dard had been satisfied.59 If the officials could present any evidence re-
flecting a national security concern, the courts interpreted Harlow to pre-
clude inquiry into the motives behind the warrantless electronic
surveillances. 60
1879-72 (D.D.C. June 20, 1984); Ellsberg v. Mitchell, No. 1879-72 (D.D.C. July 22, 1983).
57. The plaintiffs' claims were predicated on alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment and
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, P.L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197,
211-225 (prior to 1978 amendment). At the time the challenged wiretaps were authorized and con-
ducted, taps initiated for national security purposes were not subject to the clearly established warrant
and reasonableness requirements that were imposed by the Fourth Amendment and Title III on wire-
taps undertaken for all other purposes. Hence, whether there had been a constitutional or statutory
violation depended upon whether the wiretaps had been conducted for valid national security reasons.
See Smith v. Nixon, 582 F. Supp. at 713.
58. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-18.
59. See, e.g., Zweibon v. Mitchell, 720 F.2d 162, 173 n.18 (1983) ("[A]llegations of prosecutorial
purpose raise no genuine issues relevant to the defense of qualified immunity."), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 244 (1984); Burkhart v. Saxbe, 596 F. Supp. 96, 100 (E.D. Pa. 1984) ("The subjective state of
mind of the Attorney General in authorizing the wiretap should not be investigated under
Harlow. . . .Harlow requires a determination of the facts without inquiry into the subjective state of
mind of the official."); Ellsberg v. Mitchell, No. 1879-72, slip op. at 3, 4 (D.D.C. July 22, 1983)
("[W]e are convinced that the Supreme Court's purpose in formulating a new qualified immunity test
was to prevent the sort of investigation into motives which plaintiff seeks to undertake. . . . The
objective record . . . establishes a valid rationale for the surveillance. Harlow precludes us from con-
tinuing further and asking if national security was the actual or only reason for defendant's conduct.")
(footnote omitted). The objective record referred to by the court in Ellsberg contained only defendants'
assertions that the wiretaps had been initiated to investigate leaks of national security information and
that plaintiffs had had access to classified information, refuted by plaintiffs' evidence that they had
never had access to the information that had actually been leaked.
60. Although the federal courts traditionally defer to the executive branch in the area of national
security, the courts in the wiretapping cases made clear that it was the Supreme Court's decision in
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By merging the principal disputed question of fact-whether the wire-
taps were based on a valid national security concern-into the purely le-
gal immunity inquiry, and implicitly resolving that question in favor of
the officials, the trial courts exceeded their function on summary judg-
ment. Harlow did not purport to alter the requirements of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 56 authorizing summary judgment."1 Hence, when
considering a summary judgment motion, a trial court may only determine
whether disputed questions of fact exist; it may not adjudicate them. As
long as the trial courts persist in determining the factual validity of consti-
tutional claims, the availability of remedies for civil rights violations will
be seriously restricted.
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This result is especially offensive because of the abuse of government
power that occurs when the otherwise legal act of an official is colored by
an unconstitutional purpose or when an official co-opts legal instrumen-
Harlow, not the national security rationale, that prevented them from inquiring into the purpose
behind the challenged surveillances. "Courts have long inquired into the 'reasons' for or 'purposes' of
a challenged surveillance, and the Court of Appeals has warned that 'courts must be alert to the
possible pretextuality' of a 'national security' claim." Smith v. Nixon, 582 F. Supp. 709, 713 (D.D.C.
1982) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). While recognizing the "doctrinal necessity of deter-
mining whether the tap[s] [were] based on a valid 'national security rationale,"' these courts have
nevertheless concluded that "Harlow renders certain facts no longer 'material' within the meaning of
Rule 56: 'subjective motivation' and 'intention' are of no legal significance after Harlow and may not
be the subject of inquiry." Id. at 714.
Even if national security is a particularly sensitive area of the law, an official should not be able to
rely on a national security rationale for a challenged wiretap when such an objective is without basis
in fact. For example, in Halperin v. Kissinger, 578 F. Supp. 231 (D.D.C. 1984), Halperin had never
even had access to the classified information which he had supposedly leaked, and the information
from the tap that was reported to the FBI concerned Halperin's political activities rather than any
national security investigation. See Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1197-99, 1204-05 (D.C.
Cir. 1979), affd in part by an equally divided Court, cert. dismissed in part, 452 U.S. 713 (1981).
61. See McSurely v. McClellan, 697 F.2d 309, 321 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Harlow did not
change the operation of Rule 56 in immunity cases); Briggs v. Goodwin, 698 F.2d 486, 489 n.2,
vacated on other grounds, 712 F.2d 1444 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("[T]he rules governing summary judg-
ment in cases involving officials claiming a qualified immunity do not differ from those applicable in
other contexts."). For a discussion of Rule 56, see supra note 27.
Moreover, in determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the court must view the rec-
ord in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all inferences most favorable
to that party. E.g., Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962).
62. The D.C. Circuit in Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 24-31 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
1843 (1985), recognized the apparent difficulty that the Harlow standard poses for constitutional
claims where the underlying substantive law requires a showing of specific intent or impermissible
purpose to establish a violation, and suggested a solution which mirrors the approach taken by the
concurring Justices in Harlow. See supra note 35. The D.C. Circuit argued that an exception to the
Harlow standard should be created to permit plaintiffs to plead "unconstitutional motive" and survive
summary judgment on the immunity issue. 737 F.2d at 29-31.
However, like the Supreme Court in Harlow, the D.C. Circuit failed to consider the interaction
between the law of qualified immunity and substantive constitutional doctrine in civil rights litigation.
As the court readily acknowledged, the exception would permit plaintiffs to allege that any act was
performed with an unconstitutional motive, not simply those for which the underlying substantive law
makes purpose or intent an essential component of the constitutional violation. As a result, this solu-
tion would leave officials in essentially the same position that they were in prior to Harlow when
plaintiffs could plead subjective malice.
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talities to achieve an illegitimate end. It is this type of flagrantly abusive
conduct on the part of officials charged with upholding the public trust
that the civil rights remedies were principally designed to deter.6" It would
be most ironic if Harlow were to preclude effective redress for those con-
stitutional violations for which victims are most in need of compensation
and for which officials are least deserving of immunity.
When an official is charged with a constitutional violation entailing
gross abuse of his power and position, society has no interest in seeing
that the burden of litigation is eased so that it does not interfere with the
discharge of his duties. To the contrary, it is in society's interest to ensure
that such conduct is unequivocally deterred. Consequently, in civil rights
actions involving abuse of government power, the balance struck by the
law of qualified immunity should shift in favor of compensating injured
victims and deterring future misconduct.
2. Questions of Law Resolved by the Trier of Fact
When confronted with cases involving controverted questions of fact
concerning an official's intent, some courts have erred in precisely the op-
posite manner from the courts in the wiretapping cases. These courts have
refused to apply the objective immunity standard on a motion for sum-
mary judgment and have instead left the qualified immunity inquiry for
the jury to decide after a trial on the merits. These courts have acted
largely on the basis of an incorrect belief that it is impossible to determine
as a matter of law whether the official's alleged conduct impaired a
clearly established right if there is a factual dispute as to the official's
actual conduct." In effect, they have confused the legal validity of the
63. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961) (Section 1983 designed "to give a remedy to
parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an official's abuse of his posi-
tion"); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941) (Section 1983 aimed at redressing "[m]isuse
of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed
with the authority of state law"); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971) ("An agent acting-albeit unconstitutionally-in the name of the
United States possesses a far greater capacity for harm than an individual trespasser exercising no
authority other than his own.").
64. See, e.g., Acoff v. Abston, 762 F.2d 1543, 1550 (11th Cir. 1985) (factual questions bearing on
legal question of qualified immunity must be resolved before any determination as to immunity can be
made); Kenyatta v. Moore, 744 F.2d 1179, 1184 (5th Cir. 1984) ("Qualified immunity cannot be
decided without a complete determination of the nature of both the wrongful act and the law applica-
ble at the time it was committed . . ... "); McLaurin v. Fischer, 595 F. Supp. 318, 323 (S.D. Ohio
1983) (summary judgment precluded because immunity question turns on factual determinations);
Dowd v. Calabrese, 589 F. Supp. 1206, 1222 (D.D.C. 1984) (immunity issues intertwined with fac-
tual disputes making resolution of immunity question as matter of law improper); Tunnell v. Office of
Public Defender, 583 F. Supp. 762, 768-69 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (immunity determination requires fully
developed record); Taylor v. Mayone, 574 F. Supp. 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (fact issues material to
determination of whether official is entitled to qualified immunity); Muzychka v. Tyler, 563 F. Supp.
1061, 1065-66 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (summary judgment on immunity question inappropriate if there are
conflicting versions of what official actually did).
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official's qualified immunity defense, a question for the court, with the
factual validity of the plaintiff's substantive constitutional claim, a ques-
tion for the trier of fact. No factual discovery is needed for a court to
determine whether the plaintiff's allegations with respect to the nature of
the official's conduct make out a violation of clearly established law.
Whether the plaintiff can later substantiate those allegations at trial is a
matter of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the plaintiff's claim, a
matter entirely unrelated to the official's immunity defense.65
The practice of allocating to the jury legal questions concerning an offi-
cial's qualified immunity defense can seriously impair the interest of a
plaintiff in a civil rights action. As difficult as it is for a judge to ascertain
whether a constitutional right is "clearly established," 6 it is practically
impossible for a jury to make such a determination. If a jury were forced
to grapple with the question of law posed by the Harlow immunity in-
quiry, a trial within a trial would be required, "with the jury hearing
'evidence' of the state of law, trends in the law, and clarity of the law."67
However, because evaluating the relative strength of competing legal posi-
tions is both a difficult and technical task, even a properly instructed jury
would be decidedly ill-equipped to determine, for instance, whether the
use of tear gas on an inmate confined to his prison cell constitutes a form
of corporal punishment that clearly violates the Eighth Amendment.6
In light of the technical complexity inherent in the Harlow immunity
inquiry, there is a great risk that a jury instructed to resolve the immunity
issue will misunderstand the distinction between the plaintiff's substantive
claim and the official's immunity defense and will consequently resort to
traditional tort notions of reasonableness to evaluate the legal validity of
the official's defense.6 9 Did the official act reasonably under the circum-
stances? Did the official have a reasonable belief in the lawfulness of his
65. If at trial the plaintiff is unable to advance sufficient evidence to support his claim, the official
is entitled to judgment on the merits, not on the immunity defense.
66. See supra note 51.
67. Skevofilax v. Quigley, 586 F. Supp. 532, 539 (D.N.J. 1984).
68. Court of Appeals judges often disagree about such complicated constitutional questions. For
an example of such disagreement, see the majority and dissenting opinions in Bailey v. Turner, 736
F.2d 963 (4th Cir. 1984) (discussing whether constitutional parameters controlling use of tear gas on
prison inmates were clearly established at time of alleged violation). In fact, even Supreme Court
Justices can sharply disagree about whether the controlling constitutional law in a particular area was
clearly established. For an example, see the majority and dissenting opinions in Davis v. Scherer, 104
S. Ct. 3012 (1984) (discussing whether failure to afford civil service employee meaningful pretermina-
tion notice and hearing violated clearly established due process right).
69. This result should not be surprising because the reasonableness standard in tort law, like the
Harlow standard, is an objective one. An individual's conduct is judged by reference to what a reason-
able person would have done under the circumstances, not by his own subjective capacity to exercise
care. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 903 (1956) ("On the whole, the law has
chosen an objective standard . . ... "); O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 108-10 (1881)
(courts generally apply an external standard rather than taking tortfeasor's "personal equation" into
account).
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actions? Answering these questions may lead a jury to grant an official
qualified immunity even if he violated a clearly established constitutional
right as long as he acted with a good-faith belief that the purpose or in-
tent underlying his conduct was not constitutionally proscribed. 70
This result, however, is exactly the opposite of what the Harlow stan-
dard requires. If the official acted with an unconstitutional purpose,
thereby violating a clearly established constitutional right, he is liable in
damages under Harlow regardless of whether he had a reasonable basis
for believing that his actions were lawful. Harlow makes the violation of a
clearly established constitutional right unlawful per se.
The interests of defendant officials may also be impaired if Harlow is
construed to permit the jury to decide the legal immunity question. Sub-
mitting the legal issue of an official's qualified immunity to the jury di-
rectly contradicts Harlow's mandate to minimize the substantial costs that
attend the trial of nonmeritorious claims against government officials be-
cause it postpones resolution of the immunity question until after a full-
scale trial has been conducted. Given that a plaintiff's allegations, even if
proven, may not constitute a violation of a clearly established constitu-
tional right, it is critical that the legal determination regarding an offi-
cial's immunity be made at the threshold of the proceedings so that an
official will not be forced unnecessarily to incur the costs of discovery and
trial.
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70. See, e.g., Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1985) (reversing jury finding that
police officers were entitled to qualified immunity because they acted in good-faith belief that their
actions were lawful when in fact officers violated Fourth Amendment as a matter of law when they
arrested and detained plaintiff for 42 hours without probable cause); Vizbaras v. Prieber, 761 F.2d
1013 (4th Cir. 1985) (affirming jury finding that police officers were entitled to qualified immunity
because they had acted in good faith even though they had used excessive force, resulting in death, in
arresting plaintiff's son); Bates v. Jean, 745 F.2d 1146 (7th Cir. 1984) (reversing jury finding that
prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity because they had acted in good faith, even though
they had violated plaintiff's clearly established Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights by brutally beat-
ing him); Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1984) (reversing jury finding that school officials
were entitled to immunity because they sincerely believed they were acting lawfully when they vio-
lated basic Fourth Amendment rights in searching students for drugs); Bailey v. Turner, 736 F.2d
963 (4th Cir. 1984) (affirming jury finding that prison official who maced plaintiff in his cell violated
plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights but was entitled to immunity because he acted in good faith and
with reasonable belief in lawfulness of his actions).
71. Confusion as to how the Harlow standard operates in civil rights actions involving unconstitu-
tional purpose or intent also led several circuits to hold that pretrial orders denying qualified immu-
nity are not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. These courts contended that
the immunity issue was intimately and inseparably intertwined with the merits of a plaintiff's action,
and thus turned on disputed questions of fact. See Powers v. Lightner, 752 F.2d 1251, 1257 (7th Cir.
1985); Kenyatta v. Moore, 744 F.2d 1179, 1184 (5th Cir. 1984); Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 729 F.2d
267, 273-74 (3d Cir. 1984), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 105 S. Ct.
2806 (1985); Bever v. Gilbertson, 724 F.2d 1083, 1088-89 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 349
(1984); Evans v. Dillahunty, 711 F.2d 828, 830 (8th Cir. 1983). But see MeSurely v. McClellan, 697
F.2d 309, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("[Wle believe that appellate review of a denial of a motion for
summary disposition must be available to ensure that government officials are fully protected against
unnecessary trials under qualified immunity on the same basis as for absolute immunity.") (footnote
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III. RESTRUCTURING THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY INQUIRY
AFTER Harlow
The difficulty that the lower courts have had in applying the Harlow
standard stems from a basic misunderstanding of the nature of the quali-
fied immunity defense and its relationship to the plaintiff's cause of action.
The fact that the law of qualified immunity prevents a plaintiff from al-
leging malicious intent for purposes of defeating an official's immunity
defense should not operate to foreclose factual inquiry into the official's
state of mind for purposes of establishing a valid substantive claim. If the
Harlow standard is to permit effective redress for constitutional violations,
the qualified immunity inquiry must be restructured in such a way as to
force the lower courts to differentiate between the legal validity of the
official's immunity defense and the factual validity of the plaintiff's sub-
stantive claim. The following two-stage inquiry would create just such a
distinction.
A. The Validity of the Official's Qualified Immunity Defense: A Ques-
tion of Law
In a civil rights action against a government official, the first inquiry
should focus entirely on the question of law articulated in Harlow: Did
the official's alleged conduct violate a clearly established constitutional
right? To resolve this question at the threshold, the court must assume
that the plaintiff can substantiate the allegations of fact in his complaint,
particularly those charging that the official acted with an unconstitutional
purpose or intent whenever the substantive law so demands.7 2 Based on
omitted).
The Supreme Court resolved this inter-circuit dispute in Mitchell v. Forsyth, 105 S. Ct. 2806
(1985), holding that orders denying qualified immunity are immediately appealable. The Court indi-
cated that an official's qualified immunity defense is conceptually distinct from the merits of the
plaintiff's claim that his rights have been violated. Because the legal question posed by the immunity
inquiry is whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff state a claim of violation of clearly established
law, the Court noted that an appellate court can review an order denying qualified immunity without
considering whether the plaintiff's allegations are in fact true. Id. at 2816.
72. Some of the confusion surrounding application of the Harlow standard can be attributed to
the peculiar fact that the Supreme Court specified that the qualified immunity inquiry take the form
of a motion for summary judgment but prohibited any discovery until the immunity question has been
resolved. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19. Because the threshold inquiry presupposes no discovery or
factual development of the claim, the procedural mechanism through which the Harlow test is applied
more properly resembles a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) than a motion for summary judgment under FED. R. CIv. P.
56. In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court may not
consider matters outside the pleadings. If it does, Rule 12(c) provides that the motion to dismiss must
be treated as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56.
Rule 56 authorizing summary judgment allows the parties to submit affidavits, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file. In fact, Rule 56(e) often requires a party to submit such
evidence:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an
Qualified Immunity
the cause of action apparent from the face of the complaint, the court
must determine both the applicable constitutional law and the settled na-
ture of that law."
If the court concludes that the official's alleged conduct did not contra-
vene clearly established law, even accepting as true the plaintiff's allega-
tions concerning the official's unconstitutional purpose or intent, the offi-
cial should be adjudged immune and all inquiry should cease. If, on the
other hand, the court concludes that the official's alleged conduct did vio-
late clearly established law, it must deny summary judgment on the
ground that the official is not entitled to qualified immunity, and the case
should proceed to discovery and trial. 4
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his re-
sponse, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appro-
priate, shall be entered against him.
Harlow did not alter the requirements of Rule 56, see supra note 61 and accompanying text. It
therefore seems particularly incongruous for the Supreme Court to have required that the immunity
question be resolved on summary judgment while, at the same time, limiting discovery.
To permit the qualified immunity inquiry to be conducted independently of the inquiry into the
factual validity of the plaintiff's claim, a court must assume that the plaintiff can prove the facts that
he has alleged in his complaint. This assumption is consistent with ordinary practice in ruling on
either a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or a motion for summary judgment. An order
dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim necessarily takes the plaintiff's allegations as true in
concluding that the substantive law does not afford a remedy based on the factual predicate set out in
the complaint. The standard for appraising the legal sufficiency of a complaint which has been tradi-
tionally applied in the federal courts provides that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (footnote
omitted). A, similar rule governs motions for summary judgment. See supra note 61.
73. Several commentators have suggested that the critical variable in applying the Harlow stan-
dard is the degree of factual correspondence required between a precedential case and the official's
conduct that is being challenged as having violated a clearly established right. These commentators
have argued that if a strict correspondence is required, it will be impossible to determine whether the
facts surrounding the official's allegedly wrongful conduct are sufficiently close to those in the prece-
dential case to warrant denying immunity until there has been at least some factual discovery into the
nature of that conduct. See supra note 51 and authorities cited therein.
If specific pleading requirements are imposed on civil rights complaints, however, a court in most
cases ought to be able to glean sufficient information from the complaint to ascertain the applicable
law governing the official's conduct and to make a threshold determination as to whether that law was
clearly established. Moreover, in the majority of civil rights actions alleging unconstitutional purpose
or intent, where the distinction between the legal validity of the official's immunity defense and the
factual validity of the plaintiff's claim is most critical, the controlling law will be clearly established.
See supra text accompanying notes 44-50.
74. Harlow permits an official who has allegedly violated a clearly established right to claim that
extraordinary circumstances prevented him from knowing of the relevant legal standard. Because the
Harlow Court suggested that such extraordinary circumstances should ordinarily be evaluated on
objective factors and resolved as a matter of law, the lower courts have primarily limited the "ex-
traordinary circumstances" exception to situations involving very recent or extremely complex law.
See, e.g., Arebaugh v. Dalton, 730 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1984) (remanding for consideration of ex-
traordinary circumstances claim where violation had occurred twelve days after Supreme Court deci-
sion was handed down); Skevofilax v. Quigley, 586 F. Supp. 532, 541 n.8 (D.N.J. 1984) (discussing
factors that bear on claim of "extraordinary circumstances").
As a result, an official whose qualified immunity defense has been rejected on the basis of the
clearly established law standard is free to raise a second motion for summary judgment on the ex-
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If this proposed restructuring of the immunity inquiry is to prove work-
able, the trial courts must be able to identify the essential elements of the
plaintiff's constitutional claim upon a facial inspection of the complaint.
Because it is unlikely that notice pleading under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 875 will provide a court with sufficient information to ascertain
the applicable law governing the official's conduct without engaging in
supplemental discovery, the federal courts should adopt uniform specific
pleading requirements for civil rights complaints.76 These rules should re-
quire the plaintiff to support his allegations of unconstitutional purpose or
intent in the complaint by specifying the factual predicate underlying the
constitutional deprivation in sufficient detail to establish a prima facie
case entitling him to relief."7 Any complaint that fails to conform to this
standard should be dismissed with leave for the plaintiff to amend the
complaint to comply with the requirements.78
traordinary circumstances exception before the plaintiff proceeds with discovery and trial. In the rare
event that the exception presents a factual dispute requiring a jury determination, an official is not
significantly disadvantaged by proceeding with a trial on the merits to resolve both the validity of the
plaintiff's cause of action and the validity of the official's claim of extraordinary circumstances.
75. Notice pleading under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires only "a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). See
generally F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.11 (3d ed. 1985) (discussing federal plead-
ing rule).
76. Every circuit currently requires that civil rights complaints be pleaded with "at least a mini-
mum of specificity." Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (discussing content of vari-
ous pleading requirements), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1843 (1985).
77. To comply with the specific pleading requirements, a plaintiff will have to set forth facts that
are legally sufficient to justify judgment in his favor. In a First Amendment employment case, for
example, a well-pleaded complaint should contain a recital of the events leading up to the allegedly
unlawful discharge or transfer, illustrating that the official was motivated by an unconstitutional
purpose.
Of course, in some instances, a government official may have exclusive control of crucial informa-
tion with regard to the purpose or intent motivating his conduct without access to which a plaintiff
will be unable to set out his cause of action in sufficient detail to comply with the requirements.
Overly rigid application of specific pleading requirements could thus result in the dismissal of merito-
rious claims. Consequently, lower courts should be sensitive to the problems confronting a plaintiff
who must plead unconstitutional purpose or intent as an element of his cause of action, and they
should exercise careful discretion in dismissing inadequate complaints, liberally granting plaintiffs
leave to amend the complaint to comply with the requirements.
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(f), which permits a party opposing a motion for summary judgment to petition
the court to deny the motion if for stated reasons he is unable to produce facts essential to his opposi-
tion, may be a useful tool for a civil rights plaintiff who lacks access to information that is vital to his
cause of action. If the plaintiff can convince the court of the importance of the unavailable information
and that there is a reasonable probability that such information actually exists in the exclusive posses-
sion of a government official, then the court may order limited discovery to give the plaintiff an
opportunity to demonstrate that he indeed has a constitutional claim that can withstand summary
judgment on the official's qualified immunity defense.
78. To prevent plaintiffs from making unreasonable allegations in their complaints which they are
incapable of supporting with evidence, the federal courts should strictly enforce FED. R. Civ. P. 11,
which, as amended in 1983, permits a federal court to assess expenses, including attorney's fees,
against an attorney or litigant who in bad faith has interposed a pleading that is either ungrounded in
fact or unwarranted by law. See Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1480-82 (5th Cir. 1985) (discussing
implications of amended Rule 11 for civil rights complaints containing loose and conclusory
allegations).
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B. The Validity of the Plaintiffs Constitutional Claim: A Question of
Fact
The second inquiry should focus entirely on questions of fact that im-
pugn the validity of the plaintiff's substantive claim on the merits. Once
the court has determined as a matter of law that the official is not entitled
to qualified immunity, the plaintiff should be permitted to engage in dis-
covery to inquire into the intent or purpose motivating the official's alleg-
edly wrongful conduct. Although these questions of fact may be resolved
on summary judgment if either party can show that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact, a trial will normally be required to allow
the plaintiff to prove his allegations. If the trier of fact ultimately finds
that the official did indeed violate a constitutional right that the court in
the first inquiry has already determined to have been clearly established,
the plaintiff may recover compensatory damages. If, however, the trier of
fact finds that there is insufficient evidence to support the plaintiff's claim,
the official is entitled to judgment in his favor, but one entered on the
merits, not on the qualified immunity defense.
CONCLUSION
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court made a technical adjust-
ment to the law of qualified immunity in order to restrict the scope of
constitutional violations for which a government official can be held liable
in damages. In so doing, however, the Court ignored the overlap between
the law of qualified immunity and substantive constitutional law in civil
rights litigation, and thus inadvertently articulated an immunity standard
that has the potential to eviscerate the civil rights remedy for all constitu-
tional violations for which the official's state of mind is a necessary com-
ponent. To prevent civil rights plaintiffs from being left without a remedy,
the qualified immunity inquiry must be restructured to force the lower
courts to recognize that an official's qualified immunity defense and a
plaintiff's substantive claim raise analytically distinct questions-one of
law and one of fact-which must be resolved independently.
